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WHY GEORGIA SHOULD GET OFF THE BENCH
AND PROFIT FROM THE INEVITABILITY OF
SPORTS BETTING
Andrew Smith*
INTRODUCTION
Although Americans bet an estimated $80 to $380 billion annually
on sporting events, only about $2.5 billion was wagered legally
before May 14, 2018.1 Framed differently, at a minimum, the
government has forgone collecting tax revenues on approximately
$75.2 billion. Rather than retain the power to tax this figure,
Congress passed the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act
(PASPA) in 1992, which prohibited sports betting outside Nevada.2
In spite of the government’s predilection for regulated oversight to
reduce corruption, Congress believed a legalized sports betting
market would increase fraud and ruin the integrity of sports.3 While
the federal government cast a scarlet letter on sports betting,
individual states retained discretion regarding the legality of other
forms of gambling, such as casinos and lotteries.4 Despite its
*

J.D. Candidate, 2020, Georgia State University College of Law. I want to give a special thanks to my
fellow members of the Georgia State University Law Review for all of your time and effort leading up to
publication of this Note.
1. NAT’L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM’N, FINAL REPORT 2–14 (1999); see also Michael
Levinson, A Sure Bet: Why New Jersey Would Benefit from Legalized Sports Wagering, 13 SPORTS L.J.
143, 144 (2006); Andrew Vacca, Sports Betting: Why the United States Should Go All In, 11
WILLAMETTE SPORTS L.J. 1, 1 (2014).
2. 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–3704 (2018); see also Andrew Brandt, Professional Sports Leagues’ Big Bet:
“Evolving” Attitudes on Gambling, 28 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 273, 277–78 (2017) (describing how the
preexisting sports betting practices in Delaware, Montana, Oregon, and Nevada granted these states
exemptions from PASPA, and noting only Nevada offered full-scale sports betting on professional and
collegiate sporting events, whereas the Delaware and Oregon lotteries each only allowed multi-game
parlay betting on National Football League games).
3. Justin Fielkow, Daniel Werly & Andrew Sensi, Tackling PASPA: The Past, Present, and Future
of Sports Gambling in America, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 23, 30–31 (2016); Christopher Polisano, Betting
Against PASPA: Why the Federal Restrictions on Sports Gambling Are Unconstitutional and How They
Hurt the States, 25 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 453, 459 (2018).
4. Daniel N. Clay, Playing the Odds: The Realities of State-By-State Suitability Determinations and
the Need for Federal Regulation, 8 UNLV GAMING L.J. 79, 80–81 (2018) (noting how courts have
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prohibition, America’s affinity to bet on sports only rose, and the rise
of illegal bookmakers and offshore markets virtually neutered
PASPA’s efficacy. Moreover, in reality, the effect of PASPA
shriveled the pool of money used legally to bet on sports and
effectively shielded millions of dollars from government taxation
each year.
Influenced by the inevitability of sports betting and changes in
public perception, the Supreme Court of the United States struck
down PASPA on May 14, 2018.5 Each state now retains the ability to
decide for itself the legality of sports betting.6 In light of such
retained state discretion, this Note examines whether Georgia should
legalize sports betting and assesses the potential legislative and
regulatory challenges that would arise. Part I discusses the history of
gambling in America and the state of gambling in Georgia. Part II
examines particular states that have legalized sports betting and
compares their legislative and regulatory schemes with Georgia’s
existing gambling framework.7 Part III assesses and proposes
different structures that would allow for Georgia to legalize sports
betting.
I. Background
The appearance of gambling in America coincides directly with
the arrival of the earliest Puritan colonists who played dice, played
card games, and bet on horse races. These activities, however,
opposed Puritan ideology and were quickly outlawed.8 Although the
recognized the ability of states to regulate various games of chance and grant casino licenses).
5. Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1461 (2018) New Jersey argued PASPA violated the
anti-commandeering principle of the Tenth Amendment, and the Supreme Court ultimately determined
PASPA was unconstitutional. Id. In effect, the federal ban on sports betting was removed and individual
states are now able to determine the legality of sports betting. Id.
6. Id. at 1484–85.
7. This Note will primarily address the sports betting structures in Nevada, New Jersey, Delaware,
and Mississippi. Although, as of November 1, 2019, thirteen states have implemented legalized sports
betting. Predominately each state that has subsequently legalized has broadly mirrored its legislative
model based on Nevada’s existing framework, while at the same time tailoring the regulatory and
taxation aspects of legal sports betting to best fit their respective social and economic agendas.
8. Sarah Remes, Legalizing America’s New Pastime: Teaming Up with the House for Pari-Mutuel
Sports Betting, 16 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 551, 552 (2016). Puritan ideals opposed
unproductive activities and, in 1633, the Massachusetts Bay Colony passed the first anti-gambling law,
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early colonies similarly outlawed gambling, lottery participation was
encouraged as a necessary fundraising remedy to help struggling
settlements.9 Lacking a strong central government, the Continental
Congress even used lottery revenues to fund the Revolutionary
War.10 However, public perception of state-sponsored lotteries
decreased throughout the early nineteenth century as a result of
widespread fraud and misappropriation of funds.11 By the end of the
nineteenth century, state legislatures had almost universally banned
state lotteries, and they did not reappear until the 1960s.12
As lotteries disappeared, organized horse racing appeared, and by
1890, 314 tracks were operating across the country.13 Despite the
formation of the American Jockey Club, which was created in part to
combat corruption, fraud continued to plague the industry.14 By 1908,
this instability, combined with the Progressive Movement’s
anti-gambling sentiment, left the nation with only twenty-five
tracks.15 However, in 1908, pari-mutuel betting was introduced.
Although this form of gambling served to stabilize the horseracing
industry, interest in horseracing would fluctuate greatly throughout

the Idleness Statute of 1633, which outlawed the possession of cards, dice, and gaming tables. Id. See
generally George G. Fenich, A Chronology of (Legal) Gaming in the U.S., 3 GAMING RES. & REV. 65
(1996).
9. Ronald J. Rychlak, Lotteries, Revenues and Social Costs: A Historical Examination of
State-Sponsored Gambling, 34 B.C. L. REV. 11, 24 (1992). In 1612, the Virginia Company of London
held a lottery to raise funds for the Jamestown settlement and by the eighteenth century,
colony-sanctioned lotteries helped establish universities, churches, and libraries. Id. at 25–26.
10. Horner v. United States, 147 U.S. 449, 458 (1893) (describing how the Continental Congress
authorized a lottery to raise funds during the Revolutionary War); see also Rychlak, supra note 9, at 12,
29.
11. Rychlak, supra note 9, at 35. See generally HERBERT ASBURY, SUCKER’S PROGRESS: AN
INFORMAL HISTORY OF GAMBLING IN AMERICA FROM THE COLONIES TO CANFIELD (1938).
12. Rychlak, supra note 9, at 42–44 (stating Louisiana remained the only state with a lottery until
1895, when Congress banned all lottery materials from interstate commerce, and it was not until 1964
that New Hampshire introduced a state-run lottery to help fund the state’s school system).
13. Luke P. Breslin, Reclaiming the Glory in the “Sport of Kings”—Uniformity is the Answer, 20
SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 297, 301 (2010); Joan S. Howland, Let’s Not “Spit the Bit” in
Defense of “The Law of the Horse”: The Historical and Legal Development of American Thoroughbred
Racing, 14 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 473, 496 (2004).
14. Howland, supra note 13, at 495–96. The American Jockey Club was established to “promote the
improvement of horses, to elevate the public taste in sports of the turf, and to become an authority on
racing matters in the country.” Id. at 495.
15. Breslin, supra note 13; Fielkow et al., supra note 3, at 26.
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the ensuing decades. 16 Nevertheless, all other forms of gambling
were almost uniformly outlawed across the country throughout the
early twentieth century.17
A. The Rise of Modern Sports Betting
As interest in horseracing declined, Americans began illegally
betting on baseball games through organized crime syndicates.18
While baseball’s popularity exploded after World War I, the 1919
“Black Sox Scandal” brought national attention to illegal sports
gambling and immediately crippled the public’s perception of sports
gambling.19 The scandal involved members of the Chicago White
Sox, who were accused of receiving money in exchange for
intentionally losing the 1919 World Series.20 In the aftermath of the
scandal, Major League Baseball (MLB) appointed Judge Kenesaw
Mountain Landis as the first commissioner of any professional sports
league to protect the “integrity of the game.”21 Despite the
appointment, corruption in MLB continued, and the public’s
perception of sports betting only worsened when Pete Rose, the
all-time MLB leader in hits, was found to have gambled on games
while he was the manager of the Cincinnati Reds.22

16. Breslin, supra note 13, at 301–02; Remes, supra note 8, at 569. Pari-mutuel betting is a pooled
system of betting where the winners divide the total amount wagered in proportion to the sums they
have wagered individually. Id. at 568–69.
17. Fielkow et al., supra note 3, at 26. See generally I. Nelson Rose, Gambling and the Law: The
Third Wave of Legal Gambling, 17 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 361 (2010) (providing a comprehensive
overview of the historical development of American horse racing).
18. Chil Woo, All Bets Are Off: Revisiting the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act
(PASPA), 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 569, 572 (2013) (detailing how the rise in popularity of
professional baseball, in conjunction with illegal gambling laws, allowed organized crime to create their
own underground sports gambling empire); Polisano, supra note 3, at 456–57.
19. Fielkow et al., supra note 3, at 26; Woo, supra note 18, at 572–73 (describing the perception that
after the “Black Sox Scandal,” organized crime threatened the sanctity of sports).
20. Brandt, supra note 2, at 275; Polisano, supra note 3, at 458–59. The scandal involved several
members of the Chicago White Sox who would receive payment from organized crime members
associated with famous New York mobster Arnold Rothstein. Id. at 458–59. As a result of the scandal,
eight players were banned from baseball. Id.
21. Brandt, supra note 2, at 275.
22. Polisano, supra note 3, at 458; Woo, supra note 18, at 575.
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1. Sports Betting Basics & Nevada’s Legalized Sports Betting
Monopoly
Similar to investing in a company’s public stock, sports wagering
generally entails committing an immediate cash outlay while making
a prediction about a future performance. Various types of wagers
exist, and the most common forms of betting include point-spread
bets,23 money-line bets,24 and parlay bets.25 To insulate themselves
from volatility and to ensure a profit, sportsbooks and other entities
that accept wagers will charge a commission on each bet,
colloquially called the “vig.”26 As a result, sportsbooks develop
betting spreads that seek to attract half of the bettors on one team and
the other half of bettors on the other team.27
While other states continued to prohibit sports gambling, Nevada
capitalized on this lucrative activity and became the first state to
legalize sports betting in 1949.28 Nevada initially imposed a 10% tax
on all sports bets and accordingly, the tax confined sports betting to

23. BO J. BERNHARD ET AL., UNLV INT’L GAMING INST., PROFESSIONAL TEAM SPORTS IN LAS
VEGAS: WHAT THE RESEARCH SAYS, 8–9 (2016); Jeff Harris, What Is a Sportsbook? (And How Does
SITES
(June
9,
2018),
Such
a
Business
Make
Money?),
GAMBLING
https://www.gamblingsites.org/blog/what-is-a-sports-book-and-how-does-such-a-business-make-money/
[https://perma.cc/5FGL-AUGM]. The point-spread takes into account the relative strength of a team
versus its opposition and levels the playing field by requiring the “perceived” stronger team to win by a
certain amount of points. Harris, supra. For example, a wager on an “underdog,” (i.e., the perceived
weaker team) can afford for the team to lose the game and still collect a winning ticket so long as the
underdog does not lose by more than the point-spread. Id.
24. BERNHARD ET AL., supra note 23, at 9. A money-line bet does not include a point-spread and
only requires bettors to pick the victorious team to win their wager. Id.
25. Id. Parlay betting must include at least two or more bets and requires the bettor to accurately
select the outcome of each event to collect a winning ticket. Id. Consequently, parlay bets are more
difficult to win, yet at the same time are attractive because potential profits are amplified. Id.
26. Id. at 9–10. When an individual bets on the point-spread, the bet is discounted by the vig, which
normally averages around 1.1. BERNHARD ET AL., supra note 23, at 9–10. Thus, for example, a bettor
who wagers eleven dollars may only stand to win ten dollars with a vig of 1.1. Id.; see also DAVID G.
SCHWARTZ, UNLV CTR. GAMING RES., NEVADA SPORTS BETTING TOTALS: 1984–2018, at 2 (2019).
Like other forms of gambling, the old adage “the house always wins” applies equally to sports
gambling, and Nevada sportsbooks have posted positive annual revenues for thirty-three consecutive
years. SCHWARTZ, supra.
27. BERNHARD ET AL., supra note 23, at 9–10. When making a hypothetical point-spread bet, a
bettor must pay eleven dollars and in return would win only ten dollars. Id. Under ideal circumstances, if
the sportsbook receives equal amounts of wagers on both sides, then a sportsbook has guaranteed itself a
profit. Id.
28. Fielkow et al., supra note 3, at 26–27; Woo, supra note 18, at 573.
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small clubs and organized crime.29 By 1983, Nevada reduced the tax
to 0.25%, and the economics of sports betting encouraged Las Vegas
casinos to open and operate their own sportsbooks.30 As the only
state to offer unrestricted sports betting, Nevada developed and
refined a regulatory system that protects against corruption and
produces honest wager outcomes.31 At the same time, Nevada has
also benefitted from its de facto sports betting monopoly. In 2017,
Nevada sportsbooks handled $4.8 billion in bets and reported revenue
of $248.8 million.32 For Super Bowl LII alone, Nevada sportsbooks
accepted $138.5 million in bets, although this figure pales in
comparison to the $4.6 billion the American Gambling Association
estimates people bet illegally on the game.33
2. Legislative Action
To combat illegal sports gambling, Congress passed the Interstate
Wire Act of 1961 to curb organized crime’s underground
bookmaking operation.34 Aimed primarily at “bookies” and not
29. Fielkow et al., supra note 3, at 27 (describing the prevalence of organized crime in the years
shortly after Nevada legalized sports gambling); Eric Meer, The Professional and Amateur Sports
Protection Act (PASPA): A Bad Bet For the States, 2 UNLV GAMING L.J. 281, 287 (2011) (describing
Congress’s intention that a high tax would discourage sports betting).
30. Fielkow et al., supra note 3, at 27 (detailing the lucrative financial impact that resulted from
Congress’s tax reduction); see also Joshua Winneker, Ira Sprotzer & Lindsay Demery, Sports Gambling
and the Expanded Sovereignty Doctrine, 13 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 38, 40 (2013). See generally
SPORTS
REP.,
(Jan.
9,
2020,
11:26
AM),
Nevada
Sports
Betting,
LEGAL
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/nevada/ [https://perma.cc/2SU8-GXQ8]. A sportsbook is a physical
location, traditionally located within a casino, which is permitted to accept bets and is responsible for
creating and posting point-spreads and betting odds for sporting events. Nevada Sports Betting, supra.
31. Keith C. Miller & Anthony N. Cabot, Regulatory Models for Sports Wagering: The Debate
Between State vs. Federal Oversight, 8 UNLV GAMING L.J. 153, 164 (2018) (describing the licensing,
accounting, audit, and enforcement regulations established in Nevada and how other states will look to
replicate the Nevada model).
32. Dustin Gouker, Nevada Sportsbooks Set Record with a Quarter of a Billion Dollars of Revenue
SPORTS
REP.
(Jan.
31.
2018,
8:09
AM),
in
2017,
LEGAL
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/18130/nevada-sportsbooks-2017/ [https://perma.cc/YD9K-JCFT].
33. Press Release, Am. Gaming Ass’n, Americans to Wager More than $4.6 Billion Illegally on
Super Bowl LII (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.americangaming.org/new/americans-to-wager-more-than4-6-billion-illegally-on-super-bowl-52/ [https://perma.cc/N7GB-WXCF].
34. 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2018); see Miller & Cabot, supra note 31, at 154 (discussing how federal
intervention was needed due to the difficulties of individual states investigating and prosecuting
organized crime syndicates operating throughout multiple states); see also 38 AM. JUR. 2D
Gambling § 33 (1999) (defining “bookmaking” as an operation that involves both the placing of bets
and the paying off or collection of debts).

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol36/iss3/6

6

Smith: Why Georgia Should Get Off the Bench and Profit from the Inevitab

2020]

WHY GEORGIA SHOULD GET OFF THE BENCH

851

bettors, the Interstate Wire Act made it illegal for anyone engaged in
the business of betting to use a wired communication to accept or
facilitate interstate bets.35 Despite further congressional action aimed
at reducing organized crime’s underground sports gambling
operations, illegal betting and bookmaking thrived throughout the
1970s and 1980s.36 Notably, in 1976, the Commission on the Review
of the National Policy Toward Gambling proclaimed “effective
gambling law enforcement [is] an impossible task,” and although the
Commission recommended the current prohibitions remain, it
deemphasized enforcement against illegal sports wagering.37
Despite nearly all states prohibiting sports betting, corruption
continued to plague professional and collegiate sports leagues. In
1978, a member of the Boston College men’s basketball team was
convicted of conspiracy to commit sports bribery after being found
implicated in a point-shaving scheme that involved members of
organized crime.38 Further, in 2007, a National Basketball
Association (NBA) referee, Tim Donaghy, was convicted and
imprisoned after being found to have personally accepted bribes and
placed bets on basketball games that he officiated.39
35. 18 U.S.C. § 1084; Remes, supra note 8, at 560.
36. COMM’N ON THE REVIEW OF THE NAT’L POLICY TOWARD GAMBLING, GAMBLING IN
AMERICA IX (1976) [hereinafter GAMBLING IN AMERICA] (finding that over two-thirds of the
population gambled in some form and 80% approved of gambling); see also Jeffrey Rodefer, Federal
Wire Wager Act, GAMBLING-LAW-US.COM, http://www.gambling-law-us.com/Federal-Laws/wireact.htm [https://perma.cc/SMD6-9LVX] (providing an overview of the Wire Act and describing how the
Wire Act complements other federal bookmaking statutes, such as the Travel Act, the Interstate
Transportation of Wagering Paraphernalia Act, and the Illegal Gambling Business Act).
37. See GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra note 36. Commission did not believe a regulated single-event
sports wagering framework would provide sufficient tax revenues to states. Id. at 4; see also Fielkow et
al., supra note 3, at 28.
38. Fielkow et al., supra note 3, at 29. See generally Ray Gustini, How Point Shaving Works,
ATLANTIC (Apr. 12, 2011), https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2011/04/how-pointshaving-works/349575/ [https://perma.cc/Y6ZC-7QX4]. Point-shaving entails bribing specific players
or coaches into making certain in-game decisions to ensure the outcome of a sports bet. Gustini, supra.
Point-shaving occurs more frequently in collegiate sports as amateur athletes are not compensated and
collegiate referees have lower salaries compared to professionals. Id.; John Underwood, The Biggest
Game in Town, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Mar. 10, 1986), http://www.si.com/vault/1986/03/10/638301/thebiggest-game-in-town [https://perma.cc/SQU6-C86N] (explaining the point-shaving scheme involving
Boston College basketball players during the 1978–1979 season).
39. United States v. Donaghy, 570 F. Supp. 2d 411, 416 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). National Basketball
Association (NBA) referee Tim Donaghy was sentenced to fifteen months in prison for conspiracy to
engage in wire fraud and transmitting betting information through interstate commerce. Martha Neil,
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Although most states independently prohibited sports betting,
Congress remained largely silent on the topic and instead deferred to
state lawmakers in a manner consistent with congressional
involvement regarding the legality of other forms of gambling.40
However, on October 28, 1992, Congress, with the support of the
major professional leagues, enacted PASPA, which virtually
prevented any government entity or individual from sponsoring or
authorizing wagering on either professional or amateur athletic
events.41 Created to protect the integrity of sports and shield
America’s youth from unvirtuous ideals, PASPA effectively made
sports gambling illegal nationwide.42 Notably, however, Delaware,
Montana, Nevada, and Oregon received exemptions from PASPA as
each of these states previously offered sports wagering in some
form.43
B. Public Acceptance of Sports Betting
In the
continued
such as
continued

years after PASPA’s enactment, illegal sports betting
to grow, and despite the prohibition, nonregulated outlets,
illegal bookmakers and offshore betting companies,
to provide a host of avenues to wager on sports.44 With

Ex-NBA Referee Tom Donaghy Gets 15 Months in Gambling Case, ABA J. (July 29, 2008, 10:31 PM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/ex_nba_referee_tim_donaghy_gets_15_months_in_gambling_c
ase [https://perma.cc/YHA9-N9VR].
40. Fielkow et al., supra note 3, at 29.
41. 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–3704 (2018); see also Fielkow et al., supra note 3, at 30–32 (enumerating the
motivations of professional sports leagues to prohibit sports betting). See generally S. REP. NO. 102-248
(1991) (discussing the rationale for seeking a federal ban on sports betting and listing individuals who
voiced support for legislation prohibiting sports gambling, including commissioners of NFL, NBA,
NHL, and MLB).
42. S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 5 (discussing how former NFL commissioner Paul Tagliabue testified
before Congress and vehemently opposed sports betting, stating “the spread of legalized sports gambling
would change forever—and for the worse—what our game stands for”); see also Woo, supra note 18, at
587.
43. 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–3704; see also Brandt, supra note 2.
44. Eric J. Carlson, Drawing Dead: Recognizing Problems with Congress’ Attempt to Regulate the
Online Gambling Industry and the Negative Repercussions to International Trade, 32 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 135, 154–55 (2008) (describing how Congress’s restrictions are limited to United
States borders and the majority of online gambling businesses are operated by foreign companies). See
Ryan M. Rodenberg & John T. Holden, Sports Betting Has an Equal Sovereignty Problem, 67 DUKE
L.J. ONLINE 1, 34 (2017) (classifying PASPA as pre-internet legislation that is ill-suited for the modern
day).
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increased popularity, the negative stigma that previously
accompanied illegal wagering gradually dissolved, leading the
general public, politicians, and sporting executives to entertain and
even encourage legalization.45 Essentially, it became evident to these
former opponents that sports betting had become a normative social
activity. Although measuring the amount bet in unregulated markets
is impossible, a 2015 Ernst & Young survey found that 28% of
American adults bet on sports and estimated these adults wagered
approximately $107 billion annually.46 Alternatively, a 1999 report
by the National Gaming Impact Study Commission estimated the
illegal sports betting market to be between $80 and $380 billion.47
The amount Americans wagered annually in illegal markets caused
many politicians to succumb to the realization of sports betting’s
impactful societal presence and suppress their moral concerns in
favor of the economic and civic benefits that could be derived from
taxing a regulated market.48 A recent study from Eilers & Krejcik
Gaming, LLC estimated legalization could yield up to $16 billion
collectively in annual tax revenues if the majority of states
implemented sports betting markets.49 Paralleling the public’s
acceptance of sports betting, the commissioners of the major
American sports leagues, which all previously opposed sports
gambling, have publicly advocated for a legalized regulatory
framework.50 Noting these changing attitudes, on May 14, 2018, the
45. Michelle Minton, Legalizing Sports Betting in the United States, COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE
INST.
(Mar.
15,
2018),
https://cei.org/content/legalizing-sports-betting-united-states
[https://perma.cc/P32K-Q9TM]. See generally David Purdum, Inside How Sports Betting Went
Mainstream, ESPN (Aug. 9, 2018), http://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/24310393/gambling-howmedia-daily-fantasy-new-thinking-us-pro-sports-commissioners-helped-sports-betting-become-accepted
[https://perma.cc/DXL5-7EFP].
46. OXFORD ECON., ECONOMIC IMPACT OF LEGALIZED SPORTS BETTING 8 (May 2017),
https://www.americangaming.org/sites/default/files/AGA-Oxford%20-%20Sports%20Betting%
20Economic%20Impact%20Report1.pdf [https://perma.cc/4LYE-GCCR].
47. Id. (detailing the inherent difficulties in measuring the scope of illegal sports betting); see also
NAT’L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM’N, supra note 1.
48. Minton, supra note 45; Purdum, supra note 45.
49. Minton, supra note 45.
50. See, e.g., Adam Silver, Legalize and Regulate Sports Betting, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/14/opinion/nba-commissioner-adam-silver-legalize-sportsbetting.html [https://perma.cc/VUC6-MZ4G] (“[T]he laws on sports betting should be changed.
Congress should adopt a federal framework that allows states to authorize betting on professional sports,
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Supreme Court in Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association
struck down PASPA and restored states’ rights to legalize and
regulate sports betting.51 Within only a few weeks of the Court’s
decision, Delaware and New Jersey quickly legalized and began
accepting wagers on sports, and in the eighteen months following
Murphy, a total of thirteen states legalized and implemented
full-scale sports gambling.52
Unlike many states, the Georgia legislature has not formally
addressed the legalization of sports gambling following Murphy;
however, a senate committee has been formed to study the issue and
possibly introduce a sports betting bill during the 2020 legislative
session.53 Although the Georgia Constitution has some of the most
restrictive language regarding gambling, three legal forms of
gambling exist in the Peach State: a state lottery, bingo, and raffles.54
In 1992, Georgia voters approved a state lottery to fund the HOPE
Scholarship, which awards in-state collegiate scholarships to Georgia
residents.55 Since its implementation, the scholarship has provided
more than $18.7 billion and helped over 1.7 million Georgia students
attend college.56 Although the Georgia Constitution was amended to

subject to strict regulatory requirements and technological safeguards.”).
51. See Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1478 (2018).
52. See generally Legislative Tracker: Sports Betting, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Jan. 11, 2020, 12:24
PM), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/sportsbetting-bill-tracker/ [https://perma.cc/8S8G-VWSK].
53. Jim Galloway, A New Front in Georgia’s Fight over Gambling: Sports Betting, ATLANTA
J.-CONST. (Aug. 23, 2019), https://www.ajc.com/blog/politics/new-front-georgia-fight-over-gamblingsports-betting/2AMqzgUcQmARZjVjarp56K/ [https://perma.cc/9MUE-GB6D].
54. GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 8 (“[A]ll forms of pari-mutuel betting and casino gambling are
hereby prohibited.”); Bingo, GA. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, https://gbi.georgia.gov/bingo
[https://perma.cc/5EUD-T3HW] (last visited Feb. 14, 2020); see also Phillip Conneller, Georgia
Republican Dreaming of Three Multi-Billion Dollar Integrated Resorts, CASINO.ORG (Aug. 2, 2018),
https://www.casino.org/news/georgia-republican-dreaming-of-three-multibillion-dollar-integratedresorts [https://perma.cc/2ENS-YT4Z] (noting Georgia is one of only nine states in the United States
that does not offer either commercial or Indian casino gaming).
55. Michael Lanford, The Political History of the Georgia HOPE Scholarship Program: A Critical
Analysis, 1 POL’Y REVIEWS HIGHER EDUC. 8–9, 18 (2017). Due to the language in the Georgia
Constitution, the Hope Scholarship had to pass a state referendum, and ultimately Georgia voters
narrowly approved the lottery by a vote of 1,146,340 to 1,050,674. Id.
56. Press Release, Ga. Lottery Corp., Georgia Lottery Transfers over $1.1B to Education (July 18,
2017),
https://www.galottery.com/en-us/media-center/pressreleaseinput/2017/july/georgia-lotterytransfers-over-a-billion-to-education.html [https://perma.cc/7NLH-JWGW].

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol36/iss3/6

10

Smith: Why Georgia Should Get Off the Bench and Profit from the Inevitab

2020]

WHY GEORGIA SHOULD GET OFF THE BENCH

855

permit a lottery, Georgia politicians have been unsuccessful in
legalizing casinos and other forms of gambling.57
Nevertheless, as neighboring states begin to profit from legalized
sports gambling while also generating income from visiting Georgia
residents, pressure to address the future of sports betting in Georgia
will quickly mount. Rather than forego these tax revenues, Georgia
should confront the inevitability of sports betting and institute its own
regulatory regime.
II. Analysis
A. Nevada Framework
States that have legalized sports betting have generally emulated
Nevada’s regulatory framework to ensure bettors wager in a fair and
transparent environment.58 Specifically, the Nevada Act and
Regulations govern state gaming and empower the Nevada Gaming
Commission and Nevada Gaming Control Board to regulate the
gaming industry.59 Nevada offers sports betting through physical
casino sportsbooks, whereby an individual may place a bet directly
57. Griffin Hamstead, Casino Bill Fails in Committee, RED & BLACK (Feb. 28, 2017),
https://www.redandblack.com/athensnews/casino-bill-fails-in-committee/article_f88f576a-fd52-11e6b673-37a7b19aa354.html [https://perma.cc/CV8A-E3J3]. In February 2017, Senate Bill 79 sought to
authorize the licensing of two destination resorts in Georgia and included a 20% tax on revenue
earmarked for the Hope Scholarship fund, rural health care and rural broadband technology. Id. The year
prior, Senate Bill 264 sought to legalize wagering on state horse races but fell two votes shy of reaching
the Senate floor. Id.
58. Miller & Cabot, supra note 31. See generally NEV. GAMING COMM’N & NEV. STATE GAMING
CONTROL BD. 8 (2014), https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Division/Research/LegInfo/Orientation/201415/Handouts/03-JudHandouts_Gaming.pdf [https://perma.cc/LU9F-U7TC] [hereinafter NEV. GAMING
COMM’N]; Adam Candee, Is It ‘Revenue Sharing’ or High Taxes for Sports Betting? Ask Rhode Island,
Delaware
How
They
Slice
the
Pie,
LEGAL SPORTS REP. (July 3, 2018),
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/21663/sports-betting-revenue-sharing/
[https://perma.cc/3HEJYST7].
59. BERNHARD ET AL., supra note 23, at 22; NEV. GAMING COMM’N, supra note 58, at 8. The
Commission consists of five Governor-appointed members and is responsible for authorizing gaming
licensing and ensuring that operators adhere to state gaming laws. NEV. GAMING COMM’N, supra note
58, at 3–4. The Control Board consists of six divisions (Administration, Audit, Enforcement,
Investigations, Tax and License, and Technology) and seeks “to protect the stability of the gaming
industry through investigations, licensing, and enforcement of laws and regulations; to ensure the
collection of gaming taxes and fees an essential source of state revenue; and to maintain public
confidence in gaming.” Id. at 6–7.
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with a cashier; licensed companies also provide mobile services.60 To
place a mobile bet, an individual must first establish an account, in
person, at a licensed sportsbook, and thereafter may wager indirectly
through a sports betting application; however, these applications use
geolocation tracking to make sure the bet is placed within Nevada’s
borders.61 Further restrictions were implemented to prevent
match-fixing because sportsbooks are prohibited from knowingly
accepting bets from athletes, coaches, and officials on events in
which they participate.62 Sportsbooks are also required to obtain and
share customer information with regulators upon request, and report
suspicious wagering activity.63
The Nevada gaming industry produces a substantial portion of the
total revenues for the state’s General Fund.64 Nevada taxes operators’
gross gaming revenues at a 6.75% tax rate, and in 2017, sports
betting revenue totaled $248.8 million, which in turn generated $15
million in tax proceeds to the state.65 Because Nevada has the lowest
gross gaming tax in the nation, this amount is low compared to the
total volume wagered. However, travelers commonly flock to Las
Vegas to wager on popular sporting events, such as the Super Bowl,
and this figure ignores indirect revenues brought to hotels,
restaurants, rental cars, and entertainment.66 Thus, states that have
legalized sports betting are not only expecting increased revenues
60. BERNHARD ET AL., supra note 23, at 5.
61. Nevada Sports Betting, supra note 30. To place a mobile bet, an individual must complete a
Nevada sports application account in person and provide the sportsbook with a government-issued
identification and social security number. Id.
62. BERNHARD ET AL., supra note 23, at 48 (explaining how Nevada sportsbooks identified
suspicious betting activity on Arizona State University basketball games, and ultimately aided law
enforcement in apprehending the culprits).
63. Id. at 47.
64. NEV. RESORT ASS’N, 2017 NEVADA GAMING FACT BOOK 3 (2017). In 2017, licensing fees and
taxation on gaming revenues enabled Nevada hotel-casinos to generate $1.6 billion in industry-specific
taxes, which accounted for 42% of the General Fund’s yearly tax revenues. Id. at 3, 19.
65. Id. at 19 (while Nevada’s revenue attributable to sports betting was only $15 million in 2017, the
state has the lowest gross gaming tax in the nation at 6.75%).
66. GLOB. MKT. ADVISORS, AN EXAMINATION OF SPORTS BETTING IN AMERICA & FORECAST OF
REVENUES
BY
STATE
1
(2017),
http://globalmarketadvisors.com/wpcontent/uploads/2017/11/GMA_An-Examination-of-Sports-Betting-in-America-Forecast-of-Revenuesby-State_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/3PEK-7C4D]. For a detailed report on the direct and indirect
economic impact that legalized sports betting would have on individual states, see generally OXFORD
ECON., supra note 46.
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from sports gambling, but expect increased tourism revenues,
especially from neighboring out-of-state residents who wish to take
advantage of legal sports gambling.67
1. Delaware Model
On June 5, 2018, Delaware became the first state other than
Nevada to legalize unrestricted sports betting.68 Due to the PASPA
carve-out exception, the Delaware Lottery has allowed multi-game
parlay betting on NFL games since 2009.69 With approximately 100
sports lottery retail outlets located across the state, the Delaware
Lottery in 2017 took in $48 million in multi-game NFL parlay
wagers, yielding a tax revenue of $8.6 million for the state.70
Regarding unrestricted, full-scale sports betting, bets can be placed
with sportsbooks at the state’s three casinos, and the Delaware
Lottery is responsible for regulatory oversight.71 Further, although
Delaware law does allow mobile betting, it does not allow online
betting.72 Gamblers are additionally limited to wagering a maximum
of $1,000 on a single bet, but this limitation may be removed if the
casino’s risk manager approves the bettor based on past
transactions.73 Unlike the Nevada model where the state directly
taxes a casino’s gross gaming revenue, the Delaware Lottery has a
67. See generally OXFORD ECON., supra note 46.
68. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 4825 (2017); see also Darren Rovell, Delaware First State to Offer
Sports
Betting
Since
Supreme
Court
Ruling,
ESPN
(June
5,
2018),
http://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/23705846/delaware-becomes-first-state-offer-sports-bettingsupreme-court-ruling [https://perma.cc/BK4D-D7SZ].
69. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 4825; see also Brandt, supra note 2, at 278.
70. David Purdum, Delaware Draws $322,135 in Bets on Day 1 of Full-Scale Betting Tuesday,
ESPN (June 6, 2018), http://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/23716636/delaware-generates-322135bets-day-1-full-scale-betting-tuesday [https://perma.cc/54US-WWAF]; see also Delaware Sports
Lottery, DEL. LOTTERY GAMES, https://www.delottery.com/Sports-Lottery/Monthly-Net-Proceeds
[https://perma.cc/75B2-KB4K] (providing a complete breakdown of monthly lottery revenues earned at
casino sportsbooks and retail outlets).
71. See generally 10 DEL. ADMIN. CODE § 204 (2018); see also Rovell, supra note 68.
72. 10 DEL. ADMIN. CODE § 204.
73. PJ Walsh, What We’ve Learned From Day 1 of Delaware Sports Betting, ACTION NETWORK
(June 7, 2018, 4:35 PM), https://www.actionnetwork.com/news/legal-delaware-sports-betting-day-1what-we-learned [https://perma.cc/9WSW-HKJ3] (attributing the sportsbooks’ imposed betting limit to
Delaware’s cautious approach and also detailing how a bettor’s historical interactions with a sportsbook
will affect his ability to wager more than $1,000).
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revenue-sharing partnership with its casinos where the lottery
receives 50% of the proceeds, the casinos receive 40%, and the
remaining 10% is allocated to supplement horse racing purses.74
Notably, distribution percentages of sports-betting income earned at
these casino sportsbooks differ substantially from that of income
earned through sports lottery retail outlets, which after paying a small
percentage for vendor fees and retailer commissions, allocates 90%
of the proceeds to the state and the remaining 10% to horse racing
purses.75
From June 5, 2018, through September 2019, bettors wagered over
$156.4 million at the three casino sportsbooks and generated a net
revenue of $19.06 million, with the state earning over $8.3 million in
taxable revenue.76 This figure does not count the $9.14 million in tax
revenue generated during the same time period from NFL parlay
wagering, which remains available in about 100 lottery retail
locations around the state.77 Given the favorable tax arrangement,
research firm Eilers & Krejcik Gaming, LLC projects Delaware
could receive sports betting revenues of at least $23.1 million
annually and as much as $49.6 million once mobile betting is
implemented.78 Rather than standing idle, Delaware seamlessly
instituted a comprehensive sports betting framework and effortlessly
capitalized on American’s longstanding appetite to wager on sports.
2. Nevada Model—New Jersey and Mississippi Follow Suit
On June 12, 2018, New Jersey legalized sports gambling, allowing
individuals to place wagers at licensed casino or racetrack locations

74. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 4815 (2017); see also DEL. DEP’T OF FIN., DELAWARE FISCAL
NOTEBOOK 131 (2017), https://finance.delaware.gov/publications/fiscal_notebook_17/Section07/
lottery.pdf [https://perma.cc/QAQ9-NQKT]; NEV. GAMING COMM’N, supra note 58, at 28, 30.
75. See DEL. DEP’T OF FIN., supra note 74 (providing a breakdown between the revenue allocation
differences between casino sportsbooks and lottery sports retailers); Candee, supra note 58.
76. DEL. LOTTERY GAMES, supra note 70 (providing net monthly distribution totals between the
three Delaware casinos sportsbooks and one hundred sports retailer outlets); see also US Sports Betting
Revenue and Handle, LEGAL SPORTS REP., https://www.legalsportsreport.com/sports-betting/revenue/
[https://perma.cc/MGX3-69E6] (last updated Oct. 31, 2019).
77. DEL. LOTTERY GAMES, supra note 70.
78. Rovell, supra note 68.
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throughout the state.79 Unlike Delaware, these operators are
permitted to accept mobile bets, and like Nevada, will use
geolocation tracking to ensure that all bets are placed within New
Jersey state lines.80 Under the law, the revenue from bets placed in
person is subject to an 8.5% tax, while sums received from mobile
wagering are taxed at 13%.81 Operators began accepting bets on June
14, 2018, and bettors wagered $16.4 million through June 30, 2018.82
In the fifteen months since legalization, New Jersey quickly rivaled
Nevada as the preeminent sports betting state with a handle over $4.2
billion and total revenue of over $284 million, $37 million of which
has been generated in tax earnings.83 Despite New Jersey sportsbooks
accepting more than twenty-five times as much betting volume as
Delaware’s sportsbooks, New Jersey’s tax model only yielded
roughly $29 million more in tax revenue, and this figure shrinks to
approximately $20 million if revenue from Delaware’s sports lottery
retail outlets is included. Although these figures do not reflect the
ancillary economic benefits derived by the New Jersey casino and
entertainment industry, the tax revenue differential between
Delaware and New Jersey serves to highlight how states are able to
creatively tailor their regulatory and economic infrastructures to
profit from legalized sports gambling.

79. S.J. Res. 4111, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2018); Eric Ramsey, New Jersey Sports Betting Is
Finally Here, as Governor Signs Bill, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (June 11, 2018),
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/21121/new-jersey-governor-signs-sports-betting-into-law/
[https://perma.cc/F4NK-2GVK].
80. David Purdum, New Jersey Adding Mobile Sports Betting to Offerings, ABC NEWS (Aug. 1,
2018,
4:36
PM),
https://abcnews.go.com/Sports/jersey-adding-mobile-sports-bettingofferings/story?id=56974549 [https://perma.cc/9QPS-XPNF].
81. N.J. S.J. Res. 4111; David Danzis, Murphy Signs Bill Directing Sports Betting Taxes to CRDA,
PRESS ATLANTIC CITY (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.pressofatlanticcity.com/business/murphy-signs-billdirecting-sports-betting-taxes-to-crda/article—9ca812f1-54fb-532e-b9e2-7dfa32b5b752.html.
82. Ben Fawkes, Debut of New Jersey Sports Betting Sees More Than $16.4M Wagered in June,
ESPN (July 12, 2018), http://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/24079224/new-jersey-takes-164-millionsports-bets-june [https://perma.cc/V6GC-CFLS].
83. For a comprehensive monthly breakdown of revenue earned at each sportsbook, see US Sports
Betting Revenue and Handle, supra note 76. See also Monthly Sports Wagering Revenue Reports, DEP’T
L. & PUB. SAFETY, https://www.nj.gov/oag/ge/swrtaxreturns.html [https://perma.cc/5PT5-6RDZ] (last
visited Feb. 17, 2020).
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On August 1, 2018, Mississippi became the third state to legalize
sports betting after the Court struck down PASPA.84 Mississippi
regulations permit the state’s twenty-eight existing gaming license
holders to apply for a sports betting license and operate a retail
sportsbook within the casino.85 Most notably, Mississippi, unlike
other states, does not permit mobile wagering unless a bettor is
located within the casino premises.86 Sports betting revenue will be
taxed at 12%, with 8% going to the state and 4% going to local
governments.87 In August 2018, Mississippi casinos began accepting
bets. As of the end of September 2019, they accepted almost $373
million in wagers and yielded over $40 million in revenue, $5 million
of which went to the state.88
B. Georgia: Constitutional Prohibitions, Casino Legislation &
HOPE Scholarship
As one of the nation’s most conservative gambling states,
Georgia’s path for legalized sports betting is more complicated than
other states’. The Georgia Constitution prohibits casinos, and all
states that legalized and launched sports betting platforms offer
wagering primarily through casino sportsbooks.89 Although the
Georgia legislature narrowly rejected casino proposals in the past, the
issue will likely confront the General Assembly again in the 2020
session when State Representative Ron Stephens (R-164th), a leading

84. See David Purdum, Mississippi Casinos Begin Taking Sports Wagers, ESPN (Aug. 7, 2018),
http://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/24257989/mississippi-casinos-begin-taking-sports-wagers
[https://perma.cc/TX6Y-SSDT]. See generally MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-76-89 (2016); 13-9 MISS. CODE
R. § 2.1 (LexisNexis 2018).
85. 13-9 MISS. CODE R. § 2.1.
86. Id. at § 3.15; Purdum, supra note 84.
87. Jill R. Dorson, Mississippi Rolls Out Regs: No ‘Integrity Fee,’ Ok to Bet on Mississippi College
Teams, SPORTS HANDLE (June 21, 2018), https://sportshandle.com/mississippi-rolls-out-regs-nointegrity-fee-ok-to-bet-on-mississippi-college-teams/ [https://perma.cc/8JEJ-JDLG].
88. US Sports Betting Revenue and Handle, supra note 76. See also Monthly Reports, MISS.
GAMING COMMISSION, http://www.msgamingcommission.com/index.php/reports/monthly_reports
[https://perma.cc/774W-N43Z] (last visited Jan. 21, 2020), for a breakdown of revenue earned from
specific casinos.
89. GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 8.
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proponent of gaming, plans to introduce another bill proposing a
constitutional amendment to legalize casinos.90
Proponents contend that casinos will not only create jobs and
stimulate economic activity, but will also generate stable tax
revenues that can be used to fund Georgia’s HOPE Scholarship.91
The HOPE Scholarship is a merit-based program that provides
funding for Georgia students to attend in-state colleges and is entirely
lottery funded.92 Though the scholarship was controversial at first
and experienced strong resistance from religious groups who claimed
lotteries would cause gambling addictions and financial ruin for
many individuals, the constitutional amendment to institute a state
lottery narrowly passed the state referendum.93 In the years since, the
HOPE Scholarship has been considered a monumental success by
giving over $18.7 billion to help more than 1.7 million Georgia
students attend college.94 However, because the HOPE Scholarship is
90. Mark Niesse, Gambling, Guns and Taxes Fall Short in Georgia Generally Assembly, ATLANTA
J.-CONST. (Mar. 11, 2019), https://www.ajc.com/news/state—regional-govt—politics/gambling-gunsand-taxes-fall-short-georgia-general-assembly/dVz5IJexBFbWfu4aHrjI9L/# [https://perma.cc/Y8VDXPRW] (discussing how House Resolution 327, which would allow casino gambling in Georgia, failed
to reach the House floor). See generally Ella McDonald, Gaming Lobbyists Continue to Push for
GAMBLING
&
L.
(Jan.
5,
2018),
Casinos
in
Georgia,
LEGAL
https://www.legalgamblingandthelaw.com/news/gaming-lobbyists-continue-to-push-for-casinos-ingeorgia-as-legislative-session-starts/ [https://perma.cc/42HC-R7DL] (describing previous futile attempts
to pass casino legislation); Don McKee, Effects on Governor’s Race: Changing Attitudes on Gambling,
MARIETTA DAILY J. (Aug. 16, 2018), https://www.mdjonline.com/opinion/don-mckee-effects-ongovernor-s-race-changing-attitudes-on/article_1719097c-a1cd-11e8-ab43-eb9d693af55c.html
[https://perma.cc/M5TV-HY2S]. Stephens previously sought support for three resort-style casinos that
would require each company bidding on a state license to invest at least $1.2 billion dollars, and the
project would be expected to generate a minimum of 10,000 new jobs for a total $3.6 billion investment.
McKee, supra.
91. Jarred Schenke, New Georgia Push for Legalized Gambling Includes 3 Billion-Dollar Casino
Resorts, BISNOW ATLANTA (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.bisnow.com/atlanta/news/economy/three-sitecasinos-eyed-for-georgia-including-metro-atlanta-91337
[https://perma.cc/FS2V-LNNY];
Dave
Williams, Legalized Gambling Supporters in Georgia Vowing Legislation in 2019, ATLANTA BUS.
CHRON. (Mar. 21, 2018, 1:21 PM), https://www.bizjournals.com/atlanta/news/2018/03/21/legalizedgambling-supporters-in-georgiavowing.html [https://perma.cc/W3XB-QPJC]. See generally Greg
Rossino & Ryan Kruger, New Analysis Shows HOPE Scholarship to Run Out of Money by 2028,
11ALIVE (Aug. 10, 2016, 7:07 PM), https://www.11alive.com/article/news/local/new-analysis-showshope-scholarship-to-run-out-of-money-by-2028/293407419 [https://perma.cc/84UJ-6WGH].
92. James
Barlament, HOPE
Scholarship,
NEW GA.
ENCYCLOPEDIA,
http://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/articles/education/hope-scholarship [https://perma.cc/669S-GA75]
(last updated Apr. 30, 2019).
93. Lanford, supra note 55, at 7.
94. Georgia Lottery Corp., supra note 56.
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funded entirely by lottery proceeds, the scholarship is susceptible to
funding shortages since individuals purchase lottery tickets less
frequently during economic downturns.95 Due to a growing
population size, there are concerns the HOPE Scholarship may not be
able to sustain its demand, with some predicting it will run out by
2028.96 Regardless of the sustainability of the scholarship fund,
gaming revenues could be used to either augment the HOPE
Scholarship or serve other areas of state need, such as health care,
education, or infrastructure.
1. Alternative Route via State Lottery
Given the legislative hurdles impeding casino introduction, the
simpler avenue for instituting sports betting in Georgia rests with the
Georgia Lottery. For a number of years, the Delaware and Oregon
lotteries have offered multi-game parlay betting on NFL games
through state retail outlets such as restaurants, gas stations, and
convenience stores.97 Before being outlawed, the Oregon Lottery
consistently yielded approximately $2 million in annual state
revenue, and the Delaware sports lottery most recently returned over
$8.6 million in 2017, which was the final year before full-scale sports
betting was permitted.98 Although these figures may not seem overly
95. Sarah Butrymowicz & Meredith Kolodner, $500M in HOPE Reserves Idle While Students Drop
Out, Drown in Loans, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.myajc.com/news/500m-hopereserves-idle-while-students-drop-out-drown-loans/yyRVOvXi5xsYBuFBpxTk0I/
[https://perma.cc/9Z8J-TQA9] (describing how HOPE reserve funds have grown in recent years to
combat the growing challenges of funding such a generous scholarship); see also Kim Severson,
Georgia Facing a Hard Choice on Free Tuition, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/07/us/07hope.html [https://perma.cc/AE7K-4EZH]. As a result of the
HOPE Scholarship’s popularity, in the aftermath of the Great Recession and end of federal stimulus
packages, lottery sales could not cover the program’s costs. Severson, supra. In 2010 and 2011, lottery
sales were short by $243 million and $317 million respectively, and Georgia lawmakers were forced to
allocate millions of dollars from the state’s reserve fund. Id.
96. Schenke, supra note 91.
97. Anthony G. Galasso, Jr., Betting Against the House (and Senate): The Case for Legal,
State-Sponsored Sports Wagering in a Post-PASPA World, 99 KY. L.J. 163, 168 (2011) (noting in 1989,
the Oregon Lottery permitted multi-game parlay betting on NFL games, yielding approximately $2
million in annual state revenue); see also Meer, supra note 29, at 288–89. Despite the relative success of
the Oregon sports lottery, the lottery was outlawed in 2007 as the NCAA, long opposed to sports
wagering, boycotted Oregon stadiums from hosting post-season collegiate basketball games. Id.
98. Galasso, Jr., supra note 97, at 168–69; Purdum, supra note 70; see also Nicholaus Garcia,
Oregon Lottery Projects $100 Million in Annual Revenue from Legal Sports Betting, LEGAL SPORTS
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impressive, greater potential lies beneath the surface. First, neither of
these states offered mobile betting, which is expected to be the
driving force behind future sports wagering growth as individuals can
place bets remotely without having to drive to a physical location.
Second, statistically, parlay bets are considerably more difficult to
win because a bettor must win multiple games to collect a winning
ticket, whereas betting on a single game offers a 50% chance of
success. Absent the most risk-seeking bettors, individuals
traditionally prefer to wager on single games rather than placing
parlay bets. Finally, the tax figures from the Delaware and Oregon
lotteries only produce revenue during the months when professional
football games are played. Because the NFL season only runs from
August to the first weekend of February, the majority of months earn
no revenue. Given that Georgia already has a state lottery and also
has a population nearly ten times greater than that of Delaware’s, it is
not presumptuous to predict that significant tax revenues from sports
betting could be available to the Peach State.99 In fact, a 2017 Oxford
Economics report projects that even with limited wagering
availability and a base tax rate, Georgia could conservatively
generate nearly $100 million in sports betting revenue each year.100
C. Opposing Rationales & Hypocritical Ideology
Opposition to sports betting continues to rest on moral, religious,
or financial grounds.101 Some opponents claim that tax revenues from
REP.,
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/24409/oregon-lottery-sports-betting-revenue/
[https://perma.cc/XX77-P6LT] (last updated Sept. 26, 2018). According to a recent report, Oregon
lottery officials believe that the addition of mobile betting could net the state over $120 million in
revenue from sports betting annually. Garcia, supra.
99. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, QUICK FACTS DELAWARE (2017), https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/de
[https://perma.cc/UGL6-AGET] [hereinafter QUICK FACTS DELAWARE] (noting Delaware’s population
was 961,939 as of July 1, 2017); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, QUICK FACTS GEORGIA (2017),
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/ga [https://perma.cc/H4HN-54BK] [hereinafter QUICK FACTS
GEORGIA] (noting Georgia’s population was 10,429,379 as of July 1, 2017).
100. James Swift, Local Legislators Shaky on Sports Betting Legalization, DAILY TRIB. NEWS (June
2,
2018),
http://www.daily-tribune.com/stories/local-legislators-shaky-on-sports-bettinglegalization,19009 [https://perma.cc/ULM4-RSVT].
101. Polisano, supra note 3, at 485; Elaine S. Povich, How States Are Gambling on Sports Betting
Case, PEW CHARITABLE TR. (Jan. 31, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/blogs/stateline/2018/01/31/how-states-are-gambling-on-sports-betting-case
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sports betting will produce short-term gains, with states that legalize
shortly after Murphy experiencing brief economic success until
neighboring states follow suit and saturate the marketplace.102 Other
critics claim that the tax revenue proceeds the state would receive
would not be large enough to justify legalization.103 Although many
factors will affect the amount of revenue a state earns from sports
betting, such as population size, tax rates, and the presence of mobile
betting, proponents of legalization contend that the extent to which
profits are generated is largely irrelevant as sports betting is
inevitable, and any revenues should be directed to benefit state
governments instead of illegal bookmakers or offshore companies.104
Regardless of the merits of these arguments, it is necessary to
identify the hypocrisy underlying the opposition’s rationales against
legalizing sports betting in a state that has a lottery. At their core, the
differences between playing the lottery and betting on a sporting
event are quite minute. For instance, when an individual player plays
the Powerball, she is betting that the numbers she has selected will be
randomly chosen and she will be rewarded for her correct prediction.
Undisputedly, this is gambling and virtually identical to when a
sports bettor wagers that one team will outscore the other, and in
doing so, the sports bettor will be rewarded for her correct prediction.
Moreover, opponents citing moral and integrity concerns contend
that match-fixing is likely to increase if sports betting is legalized.
However, these arguments trigger ironic counterarguments. Before

[https://perma.cc/6DR4-HSQ3].
102. Jill Nolin, Sports Betting Gains May Be Short-Lived, VALDOSTA DAILY TIMES (July 23, 2018),
https://www.valdostadailytimes.com/news/local_news/sports-betting-gains-may-be-shortlived/article_57c022e5-0cd2-5b2e-9231-749871c664de.html [https://perma.cc/ZFT7-C3YR] (positing
that a cannibalizing effect will take place and states that legalize sports betting early will see their
revenues decrease as newer states move to legalize); see also Povich, supra note 101.
103. Howard Gleckman, 6 Reasons Why States Shouldn’t Be Counting Their Sports Betting Tax
Revenue
Yet,
FORBES
(May
16,
2018,
11:35
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/howardgleckman/2018/05/16/six-reasons-why-states-shouldnt-becounting-their-sports-betting-tax-revenue-yet/#2a82d33b3897
[https://perma.cc/2MA7-HPB9]
(predicting that states following the Nevada tax model will not generate material state tax revenues and
referencing Nevada’s $15 million in tax revenue as support).
104. Povich, supra note 101 (quoting Minnesota State Representative Pat Garofalo’s stance that
“hundreds of thousands of Minnesotans already wager on sports” and inferring legalization will shift
gambling away from the underground and into a transparent and regulated marketplace).
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and throughout PASPA’s enactment, match-fixing scandals plagued
sporting events, thus demonstrating that an unregulated marketplace
has not effectively preserved the purity of sporting outcomes.105
Historically, government intervention has been implemented to
decrease corruption by curbing certain actions and opportunities, yet
it remains unclear why sports betting opponents believe an inverse
relationship exists in a regulated marketplace.
III. Proposal
As more states legalize sports betting, Georgia should follow suit
and move to allow for a vote to amend its constitution. As of October
31, 2019, thirteen states have already accepted bets on sporting
events, including nearby states such as Kentucky, South Carolina,
and Louisiana.106 Quite simply, sports betting is only going to grow,
and states that do not permit sports betting will reject a stable flow of
tax revenues.107 Further, residents of states that do not offer sports
betting will travel to neighboring states to bet and will instead
contribute to those states’ tax revenues.
A. Why Georgia Should Legalize
Critics will continue to rely on moral and religious grounds, such
as potential increases in gambling addiction, as their basis of
opposition. For instance, Representative Matthew Gambill (R-15th)
is not a proponent of sports betting because he believes it has a
“deleterious social impact.”108 Regardless of the merits of these
arguments, Georgia already has a state lottery, which effectively
renders these contentions moot given the similarities between playing
105. See United States v. Donaghy, 570 F. Supp. 2d 411, 416 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); see also Fielkow et
al., supra note 3, at 29; Underwood, supra note 38 (discussing a scheme to shave points by Boston
College basketball players during the 1978-79 season).
106. Legislative Tracker: Sports Betting, supra note 52. As of October 31, 2019, thirteen states offer
full-scale sports betting. Id.
107. SCHWARTZ, supra note 26. Nevada sportsbooks have been profitable for at least thirty-three
consecutive years. Id.
108. Swift, supra note 100. Any sports betting legislation would likely begin with the Senate
Committee on Regulated Industries and Utilities, who would draft initial frameworks and then present
different scenarios to the state Senate. Id.
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the lottery and betting on a sporting event. It is perplexing how
opponents of sports betting categorically differentiate between the
moral and social righteousness of playing the lottery, drinking
alcohol, or smoking cigarettes with betting on sports, and even more
confounding why the formers of these so-called vice activities are
legally and socially permitted while sports betting is illegal.109
Even assuming Representative Gambill is correct that betting on
sports has a “deleterious social impact,” how does gambling on the
lottery not have a similarly harmful or unvirtuous societal impact?
Alternatively, what positive social impact does playing the lottery
provide that sports betting fails to replicate? Both activities are done
for either monetary reward or entertainment purposes, yet the odds of
winning the Powerball or Mega Millions jackpots are infinitesimal,
whereas betting on a sporting outcome against the point-spread is a
coin-toss.110 Furthermore, though the majority of Americans wager
on sports casually, there remains a sizable portion of individuals
dedicated to betting on sports as a full-time profession.111 Whereas
gambling on the lottery requires no skill and relies solely on the luck
of the draw, professional sports bettors research and analyze
historical scoring trends, team personnel, player tendencies, weather
reports, coaching schematics, travel schedules, and a host of other
variables to increase the likelihood of winning their bets.112 Though
109. See generally Franklin Liu, Sin Taxes: Have Governments Gone Too Far in Their Efforts to
Monetize Morality?, 59 B.C. L. REV. 763 (2018) (providing a comparison of traditional and
non-traditional sin taxes). Many goods and services, such as alcohol, tobacco, gambling, candy, and soft
drinks, are subject to state “sin taxes” because their consumption is deemed harmful to individuals or
socially undesirable. Id. at 764. The rationale for these taxes is that, as opposed to traditional sales taxes,
sin taxes raise the price of such goods in an effort to discourage consumer demand. Id. at 764–65.
110. Kevin Breuninger, The Odds of Winning Those Record Powerball, Mega Millions Jackpots Are
Beyond Slim, CNBC (Jan. 5, 2018, 1:42 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/05/odds-of-winning-alottery-jackpot-are-worse-than-you-expect.html [https://perma.cc/WQ4M-BX6R]. The odds of winning
the Powerball grand prize are 1 in 292.2 million while the odds of winning the Mega Millions jackpot
are 1 in 302.5 million. Id.
111. See generally Matt Bonesteel, Bob Voulgaris Made Millions Betting on the NBA. The Mavs Are
POST
(Oct.
5,
2018,
7:58
AM),
Gambling
on
Him,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/2018/10/05/bob-voulgaris-made-millions-betting-nba-mavsare-gambling-him/?utm_term=.04892d66b4fe [https://perma.cc/46YM-S3PX]. In October 2018, the
Dallas Mavericks hired former professional sports bettor Bob Voulgaris to be the director of their
quantitative research and development department. Id. As a gambler, Voulgaris successfully studied
game-management tendencies of three NBA teams to make millions of dollars betting. Id.
112. Id.
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notable differences exist between betting and investing, in this
regard, professional gamblers predicting and wagering on sporting
outcomes mirrors the work of stock market analysts who similarly
employ technical and fundamental analysis to determine an entity’s
intrinsic value and predict its future success.113
As to integrity concerns, lotteries have quite the checkered past
when it comes to preventing corruption; fraudulent conduct was a
leading factor in the nationwide lottery prohibition throughout the
early nineteenth century.114 However, since lotteries reappeared in
the early 1970s, strict state regulatory oversight has been effective in
reducing the risk of corruption, and modern lottery fraud cases
typically involve external actors rather than internal institutional
operators.115 Similarly, a regulated marketplace for betting on sports,
as opposed to an unregulated environment run via illegal, organized
crime, logically seems far better suited to preserve the character and
integrity of sporting outcomes.
Additionally, sportsbooks are motivated to offer a fair and
trustworthy platform to retain the trust of sports bettors and thus
share the same integrity concerns as professional and collegiate
sports leagues.116 As such, a regulated framework encourages and
incentivizes oversight while simultaneously protecting the integrity
of sporting events. In fact, Nevada sportsbooks have a history of
reporting and preventing numerous point-shaving schemes and have
113. See generally Stock Market vs. Sports Betting: How Investing and Gambling Differ, SPORTS
BETTING DIME (last updated Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.sportsbettingdime.com/guides/finance/howinvesting-and-gambling-differ/ [https://perma.cc/UM5V-LMWS]. In addition to fundamental and
technical analysis, behavioral analysis plays a significant role in both investing and gambling. Id. In the
investment arena, investors are over three times more likely to invest with local firms where similarly
casual sports bettors frequently bet irrationally on teams they root to win regardless of market signals.
Id.
114. Rychlak, supra note 9, at 13, 35 (detailing how fraudulent conduct diminished the public’s
perception of lotteries and contributed to the prohibition of lotteries from the late 1800s until 1964, and
providing instances where internal lottery operators were accused of fixing drawings and
misappropriating funds).
115. Id. at 60 (discussing the strict regulatory control modern lotteries are subject to, and providing
that present fraud cases deal with issues such as altered tickets, awarding the prize to the wrong winner,
and instances where an undisputed winner loses the ticket).
116. Todd Dewey, Las Vegas Bookmakers Know a Fix When They See One, L.V. REV.-J. (Sept. 8,
2017, 2:19 PM), https://www.reviewjournal.com/sports/betting/las-vegas-bookmakers-know-a-fixwhen-they-see-one/ [https://perma.cc/XPE6-T282].
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worked alongside law enforcement to apprehend potential
conspirators.117 Although no industry will ever be immune to scandal
or rogue actors, a regulated sports betting market aligns all parties’
interests and promotes transparency, whereas unregulated bookies
operate under the guise of underground secrecy and self-interest.
From a political standpoint, Georgia Governor Brian Kemp
opposes sports betting and referenced the 2018 NCAA College
Football Playoff Final between Alabama and Georgia in his critique,
saying “[a]s a Georgia grad and diehard Dawg fan, losing the
national championship was painful enough. [It] [w]ould have been
even worse if I had money on the game!”118 However, had sports
betting been legalized, Governor Kemp would be no more obligated
to bet on a sporting event than he would be obligated to buy a
Powerball ticket. Thus, just like playing the lottery is discretionary,
Governor Kemp could simply have decided not to bet. In contrast,
former gubernatorial candidate Stacey Abrams was open to the topic
of sports betting so long as the tax revenues are earmarked toward
improving Georgia’s educational systems.119 This proposal is neutral
with respect to where the revenues go, and only proposes that sports
legislation take effect because of the relative ease with which
Georgia could generate millions of dollars merely by taxing an
activity that is inevitable, prevalently ongoing, and currently evading
taxation.120

117. Id.; see also John Grady & Annie Clement, Gambling and Collegiate Sport, 15 J. LEGAL
ASPECTS SPORT 95, 99 (2005). In 1994, the Mirage sportsbook alerted the Nevada Gaming Control
Board of suspicious betting activity on a collegiate basketball game between Arizona State and
Washington. Dewey, supra note 116. Sportsbook officials at the Mirage had received over $525,000 in
bets on this game, while the traditional volume on such a game would only attract around $40,000. Id.
An FBI investigation ensued and ultimately two players, Steven Smith and Isaac Burton, plead guilty to
charges of conspiracy to commit sports bribery. Grady & Clement, supra, at 99.
118. Jason Butt, Could Sports Betting Actually Make Its Way to Georgia?, TELEGRAPH (June 13,
2018, 11:30 AM), https://www.macon.com/sports/college/university-of-georgia/bulldogs-beat/ugafootball/article213092154.html.
119. Id.
120. Id. Even under a conservative tax framework and limited wagering availability, Oxford
Economics predicts Georgia could net approximately $100 million in revenues from sports betting each
year. OXFORD ECON., supra note 46, at 29.
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B. Regulatory Framework
Given the absence and future uncertainty of casinos in the state,
the Georgia Lottery is the most logical institutional mechanism
through which to introduce and regulate statewide sports betting. For
an introductory guide, Georgia lawmakers would be wise to mimic
the two-tiered regulatory structure first established in Nevada.121 The
first step would be to create a state gaming commission that would be
responsible for establishing statewide regulations while delegating
administrative, regulatory, and collection functions to the Georgia
Lottery. Second, lawmakers interested in maximizing tax revenues
should emulate aspects of Delaware’s sports lottery retail model,
wherein, after paying retailers a 5% sales commissions, the
remaining percentage of the proceeds go to the state’s general
fund.122
The most efficient, safe, and lucrative betting infrastructure would
entail allowing the Georgia Lottery to set up its own retail outlets
designated specifically for sports wagering that are equipped with
lottery personnel to handle bets and payouts. Although Delaware’s
sports lottery permits NFL parlay betting at retail outlets such as
convenience stores and restaurants, this infrastructure model is
unlikely replicable for a state offering unrestricted sports betting,
given that its limited betting menu requires only minimal employee
training and lacks regulatory safeguards to identify suspicious
wagering activity. Instead, lottery-operated, brick-and-mortar
sportsbooks would operate similar to casino sportsbooks or betting
shops in the United Kingdom. However, these sportsbooks, in
contrast to Delaware’s retail outlets, would be staffed with dedicated
sports betting personnel and offer widespread betting options.123 In
121. NEV. GAMING COMM’N, supra note 58, at 8. Pursuant to Nevada law, the Nevada Gaming
Commission and Nevada Gaming Control Board work in tandem to regulate the state’s gaming industry.
Id.
122. See DEL. DEP’T OF FIN., supra note 74. After winning payouts, vendor fees, and retailer
commissions are paid, 90% of revenues go to the general fund and the remaining 10% supplement horse
racing purses. Id. Vendor fees include central computer system and terminal equipment. Id. at 133–34.
123. Zach Schreiber, The Time Is Now: Why the United States Should Adopt the British Model of
Sports Betting Legislation, 27 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 353, 371, 375 (2017).
Motivated to eliminate illegal bookmaking operations, the British Parliament passed the Betting and
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addition to creating new jobs, these lottery-operated sportsbooks
would allow regulatory personnel to handle all bets and uniformly
monitor suspicious wagering activities across different operating
locations.
Finally, the financial benefits that accompany legalization are
simply too lucrative to ignore and would provide Georgia with a new
source of stable tax revenues that can be used to improve specific
programs and sectors of state concern. Though the true size of the
Georgia sports betting market is impossible to discern in its current
unregulated state, economic models and the recent success in New
Jersey and Delaware suggest sports betting could yield somewhere in
the vicinity of $50 million to $100 million in initial tax revenues.124
Although Georgia has no experience in the sports-betting
marketplace, it has a population over ten times the size of
Delaware’s, is home to four professional sports teams, and is
centrally located in the heartland of collegiate football.125 Even under
a conservative approach, Georgia stands to earn millions of dollars in
tax revenues, and the potential for annual revenues reaching $100
million does not seem implausible.
Regardless of the framework ultimately drafted, proposed
legislation should explicitly discuss any administrative limitations on
sports wagering and enumerate individual rights and limitations
applicable to individuals placing bets to create a transparent and
trustworthy marketplace. For example, in an effort to diminish the
potential for bribery of collegiate athletes, New Jersey law prohibits
sportsbooks from offering wagers involving New Jersey college
football teams.126 In contrast, the Nevada and Mississippi regulations

Gaming Act of 1960, which legalized betting shops to accept sports wagers. Id. at 371. British betting
shops are the functional equivalents of casino sportsbooks but are located in traditional retail locations
throughout the country. Id. at 375.
124. See generally OXFORD ECON., supra note 46.
125. QUICK FACTS DELAWARE, supra note 99; QUICK FACTS GEORGIA, supra note 99. See generally
Neil Irwin & Kevin Quealy, The Places in America Where College Football Means the Most, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 8, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/08/upshot/the-places-in-america-wherecollege-football-means-the-most.html [https://perma.cc/H6BS-D7A8] (explaining the greater popularity
of college football in the Southern states as compared to the rest of the nation).
126. S.J. Res. 4111, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2018).
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have no restriction to betting on in-state collegiate teams.127
Additionally, even if lawmakers are reluctant to permit mobile
betting, which is understandable based on Georgia’s relatively barren
gambling landscape, proposed legislation should be sufficiently
flexible to allow for such betting at a later date. This hybrid model
provides a general framework and combines the best attributes of
casino sportsbooks, namely full-scale betting options and regulatory
oversight, with the tax advantages of Delaware’s sports retail model
to provide a financially successful and transparent sports betting
marketplace.
CONCLUSION
With the repeal of PASPA, states are presented with the unique
opportunity to enter into a mature marketplace and capitalize on a
previously unavailable source of taxable revenue. States that have
already implemented sports-betting platforms are already
experiencing the financial benefits and are able to reinvest these
dividends to bolster public education, health care systems, highway
infrastructures, or other cash starved programs. Georgia has the
opportunity to follow the lead of such states by crafting its own
unique regulatory system that will allow for millions of dollars in
annual tax revenues to be earned while preserving the sanctity of
sporting outcomes.
Critics still rely on stale, outdated, and uninformed positions, and
ignore the inescapable truth that sports betting is inevitable and
Americans will gamble on sports regardless of legality. Rather than
continuing to allow sports wagers to escape state taxation,
anti-gambling lawmakers should concede this inevitability and take
advantage of the opportunity to financially supplement
undercapitalized state programs. In the event sports betting is
legalized, these opponents and other uninterested state citizens can
simply choose not to participate.

127. Dorson, supra note 87. See generally 13-9 MISS. CODE R. § 2.1 (LexisNexis 2018).
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The decision in Murphy has firmly cemented legal sports betting as
a reality of twenty-first century culture, and in the years to follow,
more states will legalize and capitalize on America’s affinity to
wager on sports. Georgia would benefit from heeding the advice of
NBA Commissioner Adam Silver, who proclaimed sports betting
“should be brought out of the underground and into the sunlight
where it can be appropriately monitored and regulated.”128

128. Silver, supra note 50.
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